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Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity
Dermot Feenan*
The under-representation of women in judicial office has led to calls
for greater female representation based on an argument that women
offer a different voice from that of men. This argument has largely
foundered, and a more recent rationale rests on the need for diversity
in the judiciary. However, the disadvantage experienced by women
applicants to judicial office is rooted in deeply entrenched structural
discrimination and exclusion, imbricated in the constitution of the
judge, judging, and judicial authority as male, masculine, white,
heterosexual, able-bodied, and class-privileged. Arguments for wider
representation in judicial office need to address more effectively how
the judge, judging, and judicial authority are constituted. A survey of
women holders of judicial office in Northern Ireland confirms this
exclusion. While few respondents in the survey support the concept of a
different voice, many identify distinctive approaches which can
potentially enrich notions of judging and judicial authority.
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INTRODUCTION
The under-representation of women in judicial office in many countries1 has
led to a range of rationales for their increased representation. These
rationales include equality of opportunity, representativeness, and, most
recently, the need for diversity. Some of these rationales are based on
broader arguments favouring, for instance, democratic legitimacy or
enhancement of public trust and confidence in the judiciary. It has also
been argued that women will improve justice by judging differently from
men, by bringing a different voice, perhaps even changing the position of
women in law more generally. There has been little attempt, however, to
work through the relationship between these arguments, some of which bear
different theoretical underpinnings.2 Similarly, there has been little academic
attempt systematically to survey the views of women judges about rationales
for reform of the system of appointments. Nonetheless, significant reforms
of the processes, procedures, and criteria for appointment have been
implemented in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Most of these reforms
are based on equal opportunities measures. Few have engaged with the
structural or symbolic discriminations facing women. As the momentum
develops for diversity in judicial office nationally and at the international
level,3 it will become increasingly important to clarify the relationship
between these rationales, with particular reference to the experience of those
under-represented groups. This article notes, however, that these rationales
do not address the symbolic exclusion of women from traditional notions of
judging and judicial authority. These notions are based primarily on male-
centred perspectives, norms, and images, which are linked to historic broader
structural exclusion of women from judicial office. The article argues, with
reference both to the existing literature and data from a small survey of
women judges in Northern Ireland, that this traditionally under-represented
group appears to offer additional understandings of the role of judging which
challenge traditional notions of judging and judicial authority. It is suggested
that such understandings, which emphasize the distinctiveness of
background and experience (contrapuntal to the assumed neutrality of
judging), can enhance the diversity rationale for more women (and indeed
other under-represented groups) being appointed to judicial office.
The article first outlines the rationales for more women judges, then
proceeds to identify how notions of judging and judicial authority exclude
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1 U. Schultz and G. Shaw (eds.), Women in the World's Legal Professions (2003).
2 However, see K. Malleson, `Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why
Difference Won't Do' (2003) 11 Feminist Legal Studies 1±24; K.R. Johnson and L.
Fuentes-Rohner, `A Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity in the
Judiciary' (2004±05) 10 Michigan J. of Race & Law 5±53.
3 K. Malleson and P.H. Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power
(2006).
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women, before finally arguing, based on findings from the survey and related
literature, for an expanded diversity rationale.
RATIONALES FOR MORE WOMEN JUDGES
An early rationale for greater representation in the United States of America
was that women judges would `improve the legal status of women', a hope
that was not fully realized.4 Subsequently, a different argument emerged,
energized by Carol Gilligan's thesis that women bring an ethic of care to
issues of justice in contrast to the rights-based approach of men.5 One of the
better-known judicial views in support of this thesis came in 1990 with the
paper by Justice Bertha Wilson, of the Supreme Court of Canada, `Will
Women Judges Really Make a Difference?'6 While there has been some
rehabilitation of Gilligan's thesis,7 her approach has sustained heavy
criticism.8 Former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor of the US Supreme Court
regarded the very question of whether women would judge differently as
both `dangerous and unanswerable'.9 The key objections ± with which this
author agrees ± are that such an argument risks reifying certain `feminine'
ideals perceived as unique to women, and fails to account for significant
differences between women based, for example, on sexual orientation, class,
caste, and race. A further objection is that it does not account for the
constraints on women of legal professional socialization. Even those surveys
which attempt to detect difference, struggle, perhaps unsurprisingly, to
support the claim, and, indeed, some negate the assertion.10
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4 B.B. Cook, `Will Women Judges Make a Difference in Women's Legal Rights? A
Prediction from Attitudes and Simulated Behaviour' in Women, Power and Political
Systems, ed. M.N. Rendel (1981) 216±39, at 217.
5 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982); C. Menkel-Meadow, `Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process' (1985) 1 Berkeley Women's
Law J. 39±63; L. Goldstein, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Debate
(1992).
6 B. Wilson, `Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?' (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall Law J. 506±22.
7 E. Rackley, `From Arachne to Charlotte: An Imaginative Revisiting of Gilligan's In
a Different Voice' (2007) 13 William & Mary J. of Women and the Law 751±74.
8 B. Hamilton, `Criteria for Judicial Appointment and `` Merit''' (1999) 15 Queens-
land University of Technology Law Rev. 10±22; H. Sommerlad, `Can Women
Lawyer Differently? A Perspective from the UK' in Schultz and Shaw, op. cit., n. 1,
192±224; and Malleson, op. cit., n. 2.
9 S. Day O'Connor, `Portia's Progress' (1991) 66 New York University Law Rev.
1546±58, at 1557.
10 For a review of a number of surveys pre-2003, see, for example, chapters in Schultz
and Shaw, op. cit., n. 1. Examples of subsequent surveys ± finding differences
between men and women judges in some discrimination claims ± include: F.O.
Smith, `Gendered Justice: Do Male and Female Justices Rule Differently on
Questions of Gay Rights?' (2005) 57 Stanford Law Rev. 2087±134; J.L. Peresie,
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The debate on `different voice' has also tended to essentialize and de-
contextualize the law. It is essentialized in that it focuses on decisional
outcomes, and ignores other aspects of judging. Law is reduced to its
judgments. This is perhaps an easy failing for academic lawyers who are
trained in the forensic study of judgments, but it means comparatively little
to members of the public who are likely to assess a case and its adjudication
in terms of the fairness of the process and whether they `had their day in
court'.11 Quantitative methods which focus only on decisional outcomes,
without additional qualitative research, also ignore the women's voices
about which they sometimes purport to be concerned.12 Moreover, such
quantitative studies on decisional outcomes also typically fail to explore
critically how the concepts, pathways to, and practices of the judge are
constituted.13
There has, therefore, been a move in the United Kingdom and elsewhere
away from the `different voice' rationale to two related arguments. First, an
argument based on equality of opportunity. As Baroness Hale has argued,
`all properly qualified and suitable candidates should have a fair crack of the
whip and an equal chance of appointment, being considered impartially and
solely on their merits and not in some other way or for some other reason.'14
The second argument is that the judiciary should be reflective of society, not
drawn from a narrow demographic background. Certainly within England
and Wales the judge is traditionally a man from a narrow class and educa-
tional background of independent, fee-paying schools and Oxbridge.15 In
2004, 75 per cent of the judges in the Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords and in the Appeal and High Courts were drawn from such schools
(half of which were boarding schools), the highest percentage of any pro-
fession,16 and 81 per cent attended Oxford or Cambridge Universities. The
argument that the judiciary should instead be reflective of society has
occasionally been couched in terms of `democratic legitimacy',17 or
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`Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal
Appellate Courts' (2004±2005) 114 Yale Law J. 1759±90.
11 See, for example, R. Moorhead, M. Sefton, and L. Scanlan, Just Satisfaction: What
Drives Public and Participant Satisfaction with Courts and Tribunals? Ministry of
Justice Research Series 5/08 (2008); T. Tyler, `What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria
Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures' (1988) 22 Law &
Society Rev. 103±35.
12 See, for example, D.R. Songer, S. Davis, and S. Haire, `A Reappraisal of
Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Court of Appeals'
(1994) 56 J. of Politics 425±39.
13 See, for example, S. Westergren, `Gender Effects in the Court of Appeals Revisited:
The Data Since 1994' (2003±2004) 92 Georgetown Law J. 689±708.
14 B. Hale, `Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women Judges?'
(2001) Public Law 489±504.
15 J.A.G. Griffiths, The Politics of the Judiciary (1997, 4th edn.).
16 Sutton Trust, Sutton Trust Briefing Note: The Educational Backgrounds of the UK's
Top Solicitors, Barristers and Judges (2005).
17 Hale, op. cit., n. 14.
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`strengthen[ing] the rule of law',18 though others see this as a component of
the equality ground.19 This rationale has often included subsidiary arguments
about increasing public confidence and trust in the judiciary,20 as there is
some evidence that lack of diversity in the judiciary undermines public
confidence in the judiciary, both on the grounds of gender21 and of
ethnicity.22
In the late 1990s in England and Wales, the need for greater numbers of
women, and minority ethnic groups, in the judiciary was conveyed through
the language of a `diverse judiciary'. This became a key rationale used by
the Lord Chancellor's Department,23 its replacement, the Department for
Constitutional Affairs in England and Wales,24 and Judicial Appointments
bodies across the respective jurisdictions of the United Kingdom.25 Indeed,
the promotion of diversity is now an express legislative duty for one of the
judicial appointments bodies in the United Kingdom,26 and is indirectly
reflected with reference to the duties of the other two bodies to appoint a
judiciary that is reflective27 or representative of the community.28 The
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18 D. Pannick, Judges (1987) at 54.
19 Malleson, op. cit., n. 2.
20 P.H. Russell, `Conclusion' in Malleson and Russell, op. cit., n. 3, 420±35, at 434.
21 H. Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About Going to Law (1999).
22 S. Shute, R. Hood. and F. Seemungal, A Fair Hearing?: Ethnic Minorities in the
Criminal Courts (2004). For similar findings in relation to tribunals, see H. Genn, B.
Lever, L. Gray, and N. Balmer, Tribunals for Diverse Users, DCA Research Series
1/06 (2006).
23 Lord Chancellor's Department, Judicial Appointments in England and Wales ± The
Appointment of Lawyers to the Professional Judiciary ± Equality of Opportunity and
Promoting Diversity (2001).
24 Department of Constitutional Affairs, Increasing Diversity in the Judiciary (CP 25/
04) (2004); Judicial Diversity Strategy, 17 May 2006; Judicial diversity strategy:
measures of success, July 2006. The Department was replaced by the Ministry of
Justice in 2007.
25 Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland; Judicial Appointments Commissioners
for England and Wales; and the Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for
Northern Ireland; and their respective replacements; the Judicial Appointments
Commission (England and Wales) and the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments
Commission.
26 In England and Wales: Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 64(1) (subject to s. 63(2),
and s. 63(3)). The promotion of `equality and diversity' is one of the three duties of
the new Commission for Equality and Human Rights in Britain (Equality Act 2006).
27 In Northern Ireland: Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004, s. 3, amending s. 5(8),
Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002.
28 In Scotland, the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland is required by virtue of
an executive mandate issued in 2001 by the Scottish Ministers to consider ways of
recruiting a judiciary which is as representative as possible of the communities in
which they serve. The Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, Annual Report
2002±2003 (2003) at 3.
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language of diversity is now commonplace in recruitment, selection, and
retention policies within the workplace.29
Earlier arguments for diversity or diversification had occurred in
Canada30 and the United States,31 originally on the grounds of race.32
These arguments for diversity in the judiciary influenced substantial reform
of the processes, procedures, and criteria for judicial appointments in the
United Kingdom.33 And, yet, some critics remain to be convinced that these
reforms will be sufficient.34 Recent scholarship has sought to address the
structural discrimination35 and symbolic exclusion36 facing women in the
legal profession. It is argued that even if equal representation is achieved,
women may still be treated as `outsiders' within judicial office.37 The
following section provides some illustration of that symbolic exclusion.
MALE JUDGES, JUDGING, AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Historically, the judge has been male. This is reflected in how the public
tends to think of the judge.38 The image of the male judge is reproduced and
reaffirmed through a variety of cultural channels; uncritical accounts of the
leading judges, the media, film, and portraiture. The persistent association of
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29 A.M. Konrad et al., Handbook of Workplace Diversity (2005); European Commis-
sion, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,
The Business Case for Diversity: Good Practices in the Workplace (2005).
30 Canadian Bar Association, Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and
Accountability (1993).
31 T.G. Walker and D.J. Barrow, `The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and
Process Ramifications' (1985) 47 J. of Politics 596±617.
32 B.L. Graham, `Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American Courts'
(2004±05) 10 Michigan J. of Race & Law 154±93, fn. 2.
33 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 64(1) requires the Judicial Appointments
Commission to `have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of
persons available for selection for appointments'. In Northern Ireland, the Justice
(Northern Ireland) Act 2004 s. 3 places a duty on the Northern Ireland Judicial
Appointments Commission to secure a judiciary which is reflective of the
community in Northern Ireland.
34 See, for example, C. Dyer, `First 10 high court judges under new diversity rules'
Guardian, 28 January 2008, at 1. See, also, M. Thornton, `EEO in a Neo-Liberal
Climate' (2001) 6 J. of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies 77±104; D. Ben-Galim, M.
Campbell, and J. Lewis, `Equality and Diversity: A New Approach to Gender
Equality Policy in the UK' (2007) 3 International J. of Law in Context 19±33.
35 E. Skordaki, `Glass Slippers and Glass Ceilings: Women in the Legal Profession'
(1996) 3 International J. of the Legal Profession 7±43.
36 M. Thornton, `Authority and Corporeality: The Conundrum for Women in Law'
(1998) 6 Feminist Legal Studies 147±70.
37 C. L'Heureux-DubeÂ, `Outsiders on the Bench: The Continuing Struggle for
Equality' (2001) 16 Wisconsin Women's Law J. 15±30; S. Abrahamson, `The
Woman Has Robes: Four Questions' (1984) 14 Golden Gate Law Rev. 489±503.
38 Genn, op. cit., n. 21.
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the judge with men, notwithstanding the entry of women into judicial office,
is deeply embedded in working practices and presentation. The traditional
working day and week of the judge was designed to suit men. While these
practical arrangements have kept many women out, a range of associations
between men and judging have also excluded women. The long-hours
culture and competitive ethos of the practising Bar ± which in the United
Kingdom was traditionally the point of entry to higher judicial office ± tends
to reflect masculine values.39 A range of attributes for Silk (senior counsel
status) which was deemed to be a sufficient achievement for appointment to
judicial office confirm this masculinist approach. The risk of masculinization
is reflected in the gendered criteria and processes by which judges were
traditionally appointed. The Lord Chancellor defined the criteria for
appointment to judicial office as:
intellectual and analytical ability; sound judgment; decisiveness; and authority
. . . [l]egal knowledge and experience . . . integrity; fairness; humanity; and
courtesy.40
As Kamlesh Bahl of the former Equal Opportunities Commission pointed
out:
Given the predominance of men in the senior ranks of the judiciary, the bar
and the solicitor's profession, there is an increased risk of stereotypical
assumptions being made with regard to `female' as opposed to `male' qualities
and aptitudes.41
Bahl referred to the risk with criteria such as `decisiveness' and `authority'
that `[w]henever there is subjective judgment, sex bias can easily occur'.42
Conversely, a number of assumptions about women's feminine attributes
tend to naturalize divisions of labour (such as women being better at Family
Law, men at Criminal Law) that, in turn, influence appointment to judicial
office. The historical lack of transparency in appointments to judicial office
which flowed from the system of `secret soundings' contributed to what was
termed a `cloning' tendency in judicial selection.43
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39 Though it should be noted that various types of masculinity exist; see, for example,
R.W. Connell, Masculinities (1995).
40 Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Lord Chancellor, `Speech to the 1998 Women Lawyer
Conference', London, 25 April 1998.
41 `Judicial Appointments Procedures', Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in
Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, Third Report of Session 1995±96, HC 52-II,
211.
42 id. See, also: C. McGlynn, `Judging Women Differently: Gender, the Judiciary and
Reform' in Feminist Perspectives on Public Law, eds. S. Millns and N. Whitty
(1999) 87±106; B. Hamilton, `The Law Council of Australia Policy 2001 on the
Process of Judicial Appointments: Any Good News for Future Female Judicial
Appointees?' (2001) 1 QUT Law and Justice J. 223±40.
43 H. Kennedy, Eve was Framed: Women and British Justice (1992); See, also,
Commission for Judicial Appointments, Her Majesty's Commissioners for Judicial
Appointments: Response to DCA Consultation Paper `Increasing Diversity in the
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The judge, and the senior cohort of the Bar from which he was drawn,
operates within a particular social field, whose routinized and internalized
understandings ± what Bourdieu termed the habitus44 ± replicate the
masculinization of senior counsel and judicial office. According to these
understandings the individual role of the barrister in court requires a certain
bearing. It is no surprise that that `bearing' tends to reflect masculine
characteristics. When the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland states that
senior counsel, from whom the senior judiciary have historically been drawn,
require `a presence, an authority', does one imagine a woman or man?45 One
of the other male judges in the Northern Ireland survey stated that Silk
required `a certain amount of gravitas', a term that would typically be
applied only to men.46 The masculinization of the judge is also reinforced
through performative adaptation of the voice which may require of women
extraordinary modifications to timbre and pace. Dame Elizabeth Butler-
Sloss, for instance, recalls, `I worked on that as much as I have worked on
anything in order to get it deeper.'47 The judge's dress is another site for the
gendered production of the judge and judicial authority. As Baroness Hale
observes, `[n]ot surprisingly he dresses up in wig and gown to provide . . .
anonymity and that masculinity.' The wearing of wigs particularly, she
continued, `humanises us all into men. They deny us our femaleness let alone
our femininity.'48
In addition, the exclusion of women from the networks and socializing
available to men, traditionally termed the `old boy's network', denied them
access to the flows of information which were important in maintaining
presence and authority. The exclusion of women from such flows may also
represent a form of subordination, in that women are excluded from
significant sources of informal knowledge.49 Baroness Hale recalls how,
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Judiciary' (2005), and interview with Janet Tweedale, Department for
Constitutional Affairs, London, 1 February 2005, regarding the informal system
in England and Wales in which it was stated that there was some anecdotal evidence
that judges did not appoint those `not like us'.
44 P. Bourdieu, `The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987)
38Hastings Law J. 805±53. For further discussion in the context of professional legal
identity formation, see H. Sommerlad, `Researching and Theorizing the Processes of
Professional Identity Formation' (2007) 34 J. of Law and Society 190±217, and, with
particular reference to gender, F.M. Kay and J. Hagan, `Raising the Bar: The Gender
Stratification of Law-Firm Capital' (1998) 63 Am. Sociological Rev. 728±43.
45 Interview, 15 February 2005.
46 Judicial Respondent V.
47 E. Cruikshank, Women in the Law: Strategic Career Management (2003) at 91.
48 Hale, op. cit., n. 14, at p. 497. See a similar argument about the eradication of
individual (female) identity in S.L. Berns, To Speak as a Judge: Difference, Voice
and Power (1990). From 1 October 2008 the wig is no longer required of many
judges, under new rules on court dress; see, F. Gibb, `Model Judge and his Funky
New Gown' Times, 13 May 2008, 3.
49 D. Feenan, `Understanding Disadvantage Partly through an Epistemology of
Ignorance' (2007) 16 Social & Legal Studies 509±32.
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when first on circuit the male judges asked her to leave the room following
dinner, so that they could talk among themselves.50
A number of scholars have identified how the judge and judicial authority is
gendered. Rackley, starting first with her adoption of the fairytales of the Little
Mermaid and the Emperor with no Clothes, illustrated the powerful myth of
the judge as male.51 This view is echoed by Baroness Hale who notes that the
ideal of the judge as anonymous, dehumanized, impartial, and authoritative is
`intrinsically male'.52 She continues: `We have to challenge the notion that the
only person who can be taken seriously as a neutral and fair-minded person is
the judicial equivalent of a tall man in a suit'.53 The male judge becomes
synonymous with what Thornton terms the `authoritative knower'.54 Women
are `other' to the image of judicial authority.55 This phenomenon of exclusion
from the concept of the `authoritative knower' is not limited to law. The
othering of women as suitable for particular authoritative professional roles
has been documented in relation to other professional careers such as
architecture,56 medicine,57 and investment banking.58 As McDowell observes,
`the very notion of authority is associated with masculinity.'59 As authority
tends also to signify power,60 it cross-cuts with other markers of power such as
class, sexual orientation, religion, and race.61
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50 Hale, op. cit., n. 14, at fn. 20.
51 E. Rackley, `Representation of the (Woman) Judge: Hercules, the Little Mermaid,
and the Vain and Naked Emperor' (2002) 22 Legal Studies 602±24.
52 Hale, op. cit., n. 14; See, also, B. Hale, `The Appointment and Removal of Judges:
Independence and Diversity', speech to the International Association of Women
Judges, 8th Biennial Conference, 3±7 May 2006, Sydney, Australia.
53 B. Hale, `Making a Difference? Why We Need a More Diverse Judiciary' (2005) 56
Northern Ireland Legal Q. 281±92.
54 M. Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (1996).
55 Berns, op. cit., n. 48; S.L. Berns and P. Baron, `Bloody Bones: A Legal Ghost Story
and Entertainment in Two Voices ± To Speak as a Judge' (1994) 2 Aus. Feminist
Law J. 125±49.
56 B. Fowler and F. Wilson, `Women Architects and their Discontents' (2004) 38
Sociology 101±19; A. Saint, The Image of the Architect (1983).
57 R. Pringle, Sex and Medicine: Gender, Power and Authority in the Medical
Profession (1998).
58 L. McDowell, Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City (1997).
59 id., p. 151. The association of authority with men, has been identified by other
scholars, including M. Thornton, ``` Otherness'' on the Bench: How Merit is
Gendered' (2007) 29 Sydney Law Rev. 391±413; K.B. Jones, `On Authority: Or,
Why Women are not Entitled to Speak' in Authority Revisited, eds. J.R. Pennock
and J.W. Chapman (1987) 152±68.
60 L. Morley, `Hidden Transcripts: The Micropolitics of Gender in Commonwealth
Universities' (2006) 29Women's Studies International Forum 543±51: `The valuing
and evaluation of knowledge, ability, expertise and competence are central to the
workings and transmission of power' (p. 546).
61 C. Wright, S. Thompson, and Y. Channet, `Out of Place: Black Women Academics
in British Universities' (2007) 16 Women's History Rev. 145±162, who state that
Black women in academia have been excluded from the imagined embodiment of
positions of authority.
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The extent of women's exclusion from appellate levels of judicial office
may reflect the fact that it is at such levels that `binding', authoritative law is
considered to be produced.62 Those who produce law in these sites have
particular authority within the judicial system. The image or concept of the
proper judge at these levels becomes potent. Male judges have acted as
gatekeepers to senior judicial office, or `the Bench'. One of the female
respondents in the current study, said:
The Bench . . . are happier to appoint women to what they would regard as
periphery judicial posts . . . which they can pooh-pooh as `well it's not really
law, not really' . . . That was the attitude of the previous two Chief Justices:
`Of course those women are all very well but we have to keep them in their
proper place, and certainly not on the Bench.'63
The argument that men judges may need to make room for women judges
has been fought partly on the apparently neutral grounds of appointment on
`merit' and preserving judicial `impartiality'. Former Justice L'Heureux-
DubeÂ of the Supreme Court of Canada noted in 1997:
Women judges and adjudicators are finding themselves the targets of unfairly
harsh criticism and allegations of bias, particularly ± but not exclusively ±
when they have relied on a new perspective or more inclusive principles.64
Former Justice Wilson, also of the Supreme Court of Canada, was criticized
`for playing politics, and not being impartial' for suggesting that women
might bring alternative perspectives to judging.65 The arguments based on
neutrality require assessment against the content of the concepts of
`impartiality' or `bias' (which reflect their own presuppositions and which
can change over time).66 Bias is well-documented in judgments,67 and is, it
has been argued, certainly from feminist perspectives on the male biases of
law, to be characteristic within judging.68 The myth of neutrality is one
which has served to veil and protect the maleness of the judiciary. Where
there has been any suggestion that women might bring a different approach,
this has exacerbated male backlash. Following the announcement of Hale
LJ's appointment to the House of Lords in 2003, she was criticized for her
views, in what was deemed `a textbook case of sexist journalism and the
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62 R. Graycar, `The Gender of Judgments: An Introduction' in Public and Private:
Feminist Legal Debate, ed. M. Thornton (1995) 262±82, at 262.
63 Respondent H.
64 C. L'Heureux-DubeÂ, `Making A Difference: The Pursuit of a Compassionate
Justice' (1997) 31 University of British Columbia Law Rev. 1±15, at 7.
65 This was the position of REAL (Realistic, Equal, Active for Life) Women as
outlined in a letter to the editor, `Bertha Wilson pro-feminist anti-family' Toronto
Star, 24 February 1990, D3.
66 Pannick, op. cit., n. 18.
67 H. Cecil, The English Judge (1970).
68 R. Graycar and J. Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (2002, 2nd edn.); M. Omatsu,
`The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality' in Feminism, Law, Inclusion: Intersectionality
in Action, eds. G. MacDonald, R.L. Osborne, and C.C. Smith (2005) 70±88.
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differential treatment [of] women candidates for public office'.69 The
depiction of such eminent jurists as ill-suited to such judicial office serves to
reinforce the perception of the woman judge as a threat to the order of law,
drawing upon, as Thornton points out, the historical tropes of the feminine as
disorderly or dangerous.70
The need, first, to redress the historical failure of law to take account
sufficiently of the views of women ± some more than others ± and, secondly,
to enhance the general rationale for more women ± and indeed other under-
represented groups ± in judicial office, with reference to the need for their
voices to be `respected and given authority',71 underpins this article. It is
pertinent, therefore, to now turn to the survey.
RESEARCH FROM NORTHERN IRELAND
The research was conducted for the statutorily appointed independent office
of the Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern Ireland to
examine the low representation of applications by women for Silk and
judicial office in Northern Ireland.72
1. Context
While women make up 51 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland,73
up to the end of the research in March 2005 women held 18 per cent of
judicial posts above tribunal level. There are still no female High Court, or
Court of Appeal, judges.74 The number of women holding high legal office
in Northern Ireland is low compared to other countries. At the time of the
research, 8 per cent of the total number of High Court Judges in England and
Wales were women (though the number has increased since then,
particularly at the District Judge level).75 Female representation in Northern
Ireland compared to some other overseas jurisdictions at that time was even
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69 S.J. Kenney, `Britain Appoints First Woman Law Lord' (2004) 87(4) Judicature
189±190, at 190.
70 Thornton, op. cit., n. 36.
71 Graycar, op. cit., n. 62, at p. 281.
72 For background to the research, see D. Feenan, Applications by Women for Silk and
Judicial Office in Northern Ireland (2005) 9±11.
73 Gender Equality Unit, Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister,
Northern Ireland, Gender Matters: A Consultation Document (2004), Annex 3.
74 No current data on gender representation in judicial office in Northern Ireland was
available in the public domain prior to acceptance of this article. Such data was later
published, with new findings on propensity to apply to judicial office, on 24 October
2008, at <http://www.nijac.org/publications/research.htm>.
75 For current data, see `Table: Judiciary of England and Wales Statistics ± Women
Judges in Post', <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/keyfacts/statistics/women.htm>.
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worse. In Canada, 26 per cent of the federal judiciary were women, with one-
third of judges at provincial level. In Finland, where, in general, entry to
judicial office is based in part on achievement of a Master's degree in law,
46 per cent of judges were women. In France, which has career judges, more
than 54 per cent of the judiciary were women.
2. Methodology
The research was conducted between 23 September 2004 and 28 February
2005. Questionnaires and optional follow-up semi-structured interviews
were used with a probability sample of 45 female holders of judicial posts,
representing 27 per cent of the total number (166) of female holders of
judicial office, including tribunal posts, in Northern Ireland.
The questionnaires asked a series of closed questions to obtain statistical
data (such as age, professional background, and caring responsibilities) and,
then, open questions in order to determine respondents' views on
representation of women in Silk and judicial office. Two questions were
directed to those from a solicitors' background: first, date of appointment as
partner/associate/assistant, and, secondly, the size of practice. All
respondents were asked to indicate main field/level of work before being
appointed to judicial office, and the date appointed to judicial office(s).
Respondents were also asked whether barristers and, separately, solicitors
were under-represented in applications for judicial office and, if so, what
could be done to encourage more women to apply.
The response rate for the questionnaire to female holders of judicial office
was 44 per cent (20) (of which two replied anonymously). The majority (13)
were solicitors by professional background. Of the total who responded, 70
per cent (14) indicated willingness to be interviewed, of whom thirteen were
interviewed. One further interviewee had received a questionnaire as a
solicitor, but as a tribunal member was interviewed as a holder of judicial
office. An additional four, who had not returned questionnaires, nonetheless
took up the offer in the questionnaire to be interviewed. In total, eighteen
women judges were interviewed (representing 40 per cent of the sample
population). Most interviews were conducted in the respondents' offices or
chambers, with three interviews conducted, respectively, at a respondent's
home, a nearby restaurant, and at the author's office. The bulk of interviews
were conducted by the author, with the remainder conducted by two trained
research assistants.
The interviews comprised 22 main open questions intended to draw out
some answers given in the questionnaire and to explore new issues. The
range of questions included: what motivated a woman to apply for judicial
office; knowledge of women leaving legal practice for reasons associated
with their gender; the fields of work/level of court perceived as important in
appointments; briefing practices; work/life balance; informal networks;
confidence in applying; confidence in challenging gender inequality;
501
ß 2008 The Author. Journal Compilation ß 2008 Cardiff University Law School
experience of gender discrimination; recommendations; perception of any
difference that greater female representation would bring, and culture of the
judiciary with reference to gender. A letter requesting a personal interview
was sent to each of existing automatic consultees in the process of
appointment to Silk in order to explore broader issues in relation to gender
and appointment to Silk and judicial office. This led to interviews with six
male judges, including the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, and
allowed some comparison with the responses from the female holders of
judicial office.
Some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the data. The responses
may not be generalizable. The response rate is low. There may have been an
element of self-selection among those who responded and made themselves
available for interview. Moreover, given that respondents were notified that
the purpose of the research was to determine whether recommendations for
reform of the appointments process were necessary, there may have been,
unsurprisingly, an element of self-interest among some respondents. The
survey's focus on gender meant that other issues, such as ethnicity, class,76
religion, and sexual orientation77 were not explored unless mentioned by
respondents. Nonetheless, the concordance of views with reference to gender
across a significant number of respondents suggests inferential value in the
responses which are deployed here to suggest tentatively reconsideration of
broader issues not easily measured by standard survey methods.78 A number
of themed responses to these questions are presented here. The first,
supporting the thesis of the judge as male, shows how the culture of the
judiciary is perceived overwhelmingly by women judges to be male.
3. Perceptions about the culture of the judiciary
First, respondents were asked to describe the culture of the judiciary with
reference to gender. The preponderant view among women judges was that the
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76 Two women judges referred to socio-economic status. One said:
I think a most valuable asset is common sense and experience of ordinary life . . . I
don't think it operates as much now . . . but a lot of the magistrates and certainly
the people in higher judicial office belonged to a kind of elite. They were, at the
very worst, middle-class people who had very little experience of what ordinary
people's lives were like (Respondent C).
Another woman judge said, touching on the public's perception of the judge:
How will they understand? being driven home at night in their big, fancy car to
their big fancy house? How do they understand what it is like to try and make ends
meet on social security payments? (Respondent A).
The judiciary in Northern Ireland has far fewer members drawn from public (fee-
paying) schools, and the elite Oxbridge backgrounds than the judiciary of England
and Wales.
77 For discussion, see, for example, L.J. Moran, `Judicial Diversity and the Challenge
of Sexuality: Some Preliminary Findings' (2006) 28 Sydney Law Rev. 565±98.
78 A. Bryman, Social Research Methods (2004, 2nd edn.).
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culture was male. But many believed it to be changing. Only one female judge
stated that she was not aware of any particular culture, another that she was not
really close enough to it to be able to comment by virtue of being on a tribunal.
Significantly, none of the male judges considered that there was a culture with
reference to gender. This was reflected in the views of one woman judge who
said `[i]t's individuals that make up the group. Some individuals are better
than others at seeing gender issues.'79 Five women judges described the
culture with reference to gender as: `ultra-conservative',80 `still very male-
orientated in its attitudes',81 `male-orientated',82 `still very much an old boy's
network',83 and `atonalistic and patronising'.84 Some referred to the fact that
the judiciary was changing. It is perhaps of little surprise that one female
holder of judicial office in Northern Ireland stated of the system of judicial
appointment prior to the reforms enacted by the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act
2004:
most of the people appointing tended to be male and I think they found it quite
difficult to look at women in the same way that they look at male colleagues
. . . I think there was very much a feeling in legal circles that it was a man's
profession rather than a woman's profession.85
The culture was perceived to be more male higher up the judiciary, as
another woman judge in a lower court noted: `At my level, which is a lower
level, I think it is fine, but the perception for a judicial posting from
Magistrates upwards is that it's still male dominated'.86 One woman judge
added; `I think they are trying to be fair, but I think by and large they don't
realise how much of their thinking and working practices and assumptions
actually are sexist.'87 A number of these working practices and assumptions
have served to exclude women from judicial office or undermine their
authority as potential judges.
4. Exclusion
While it has already been noted how working practices and appointments
procedures disadvantaged women, eight women judges in the Northern
Ireland survey also expressed views that informal networks or socializing
among men influenced appointments, and adversely affected women. One
thought these `very important', and noted:
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For example, golf clubs ± membership of which is seen as prestigious in some
way ± almost exclusively male-oriented, affording opportunities to interact
usefully within the profession . . . Secret societies also play a part here and, in
my view, if not banned altogether, membership should be compulsorily
disclosed. Judges are not meant to have political affiliations. In my view it is
equally repugnant for them to be members of secret societies such as the
Masons or the Knights [of Saint Columbanus]88 or Opus Dei . . .89
Several suggested that informal networking and socializing was used by
women as well, but most noted that family responsibilities prevented women
from interacting to the same extent as men:
I think that men are much more clubbable than women and, associated with
the Bar, there are a lot of sporting organisations, things like the golfing
society. I think there's rugby, football, cricket . . . all of these things provide
potential for bonding between men and also for mixing with men who are
already Silks or judges. I think this is a problem for women. I am not saying
that there aren't organisations which women belong to as well but they don't
use them, I don't think, to network in the way that men do.90
These views are consistent with findings in the Republic of Ireland where,
while there are some structural differences in the legal profession compared
to Northern Ireland, significant cultural homologies remain. In Ireland, for
example, more women than men tend to feel excluded from social net-
works.91 Similar exclusion has been reported elsewhere.92 In Australia,
Justice Catherine Branson noted that `a significant problem does arise
because, as women in our profession, we are made to feel that we are
outsiders ± not of the mainstream'.93 This reflects what Thornton neatly terms
the `homosocial' norms that perpetuate male dominance over women.94
These practices of exclusion are compounded by the discourses that tend
to operate in physical spaces to which women are admitted. Branson talks of
the `war stories' told at law gatherings in which `the agents of power and
authority in them are universally men'. She continues:
Women, if they play a role at all in such stories, tend to be the unclad young
practitioners surprised by a colleague in a senior counsel's chambers, or the
client from the entertainment industry captivated by the sexual force of a
senior counsel's measured control. Secondly, of their very nature, such stories
can only be told by men.95
504
88 A Roman Catholic fraternal organisation with charitable aims created in Ireland,
involving secret ceremonials; details available at <http://www.knightsof
stcolumbanus.ie/home.php>.
89 Respondent L.
90 Respondent I.
91 I. Bacik, C. Costello and E. Drew, Gender InJustice (2003).
92 Hale, op. cit., n. 14, at fn. 20.
93 C. Branson, `Running on the Edge', Address to Women Lawyer's Association of
New South Wales, 15 October 1997.
94 Thornton, op. cit., n. 54.
95 Branson, op. cit. n. 93.
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Women are thereby denied authority through direct, or indirect, exclusion
from such networks and through the constitution of who can participate in
narrating what is important. These practices of exclusion, which may create
a chill factor for women generally, should perhaps come as no surprise given
the history of overt exclusion and discrimination towards women in the legal
profession. It was not until the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 that
women in the United Kingdom were entitled to hold any civil or judicial
office or post or to carry on any civil profession or vocation.96 The expansion
of university education from the 1970s accelerated the proportion of women
entering the profession such that women now outnumber men graduating in
law. Yet, even in jurisdictions where women have long been suitable for
judicial appointment, they still face exclusion. For instance, former Justices
L'Heureux-DubeÂ and Wilson felt `isolated' and `the sting of exclusion',
respectively, on the Supreme Court of Canada.97 Justice Catherine Branson
of Australia recalls how women's exclusion from judging there is put almost
beyond question when a male barrister says something along the following
lines:
X's appointment to the Supreme Court, whilst most welcome, took us all by
surprise: after all he is a male, heterosexual, came from the inner-bar and he
knows something about the law having practiced it for many years.98
Even in jurisdictions where women judges outnumber male judges, such as
France, the legacy of male domination is evident in the second-class status of
women judges.99 This marginalization was identified by one of the female
judges in the survey in Northern Ireland, quoted earlier, who spoke of
appointment to peripheral posts.
The perception among the majority of women of their exclusion from
networks or socializing, such as to affect adversely their advancement to
judicial office, links with their experience of other forms of gender discrimi-
nation. This discrimination, based primarily on gender stereotypes, indicates
how women were not treated as suitable for the position of the `authoritative
knower' which is imbricated within traditional understandings of the judge.
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of Gender, Law and the Legal Professions (2006) at 116.
97 C. Backhouse, `The Chilly Climate for Women Judges: Reflections on the Backlash
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5. Gender discrimination
Many respondents in the Northern Ireland survey reported overt discrimi-
natory statements made by men mainly through the 1980s ± when most of
the respondents were entering the legal profession or were in the early years
of practice. These statements were based on stereotypes of female lawyers,
and appear to be part of a continuum of disadvantage that women continue to
experience. One female judge recounted how in the early 1980s as a young
lawyer working late one night, a colleague approached her and asked: `why
aren't you home making your husband's dinner?'100 The implicit confine-
ment of women to the domestic sphere carries with it the associated
exclusion from the public sphere. This echoes reports in Australia where a
woman applicant for a judicial post was questioned on whether she had made
arrangements for their children, and another applicant was criticized by
senior counsel because she had children and a husband with a busy prac-
tice.101 Sandra Day O'Connor, the first female justice of the US Supreme
Court, relates that following her appointment, she received a number of
letters criticizing her appointment. One wrote: `Back to your kitchen and
home female! This is a job for a man and only he can make the rough
decisions. Take care of your grandchildren and husband.'102 Through this
construction of the identity of the woman lawyer as carer/`housewife' the
concept of judge implicitly becomes a quasi-masculine category of work.
The confinement to the domestic sphere negates the possibility of women as
authoritative knowers in law.
The Northern Irish judge, referred to above, recalled another instance in
the early 1980s in which a male judge demeaned women barristers generally:
[T]here were two women in Court fighting a Family case and [the judge] said,
`I thought when women came to the Bar the standard of advocacy in Family
cases would improve and it hasn't'.103
The respondents recalled fewer references to overt sexist language since
then, though one female judge recounted hearing of barristers refer to her
within the last ten years as a `bitch' in circumstances where, she stated, `a
man in the same position would not have been classified in those terms'.104
She also noted that at a Judicial Studies Board presentation about the
difficulty of obtaining truth from children's evidence, the previous Lord
Chief Justice stated: `it would make one wonder about fantasising women'.
The female judge added that `it was an unbelievable statement to come out
with, bearing in mind it had nothing to do with the presentation and that was
his opening.'
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While the reported incidence of overt stereotyping appears to have
declined through the 1980s, women continued thereafter to be disadvantaged
in the path to judicial appointment. These disadvantages included: briefing
practices between solicitors and barristers which occasionally excluded
women; the tendency to exclude women from certain fields of work, such as
criminal law; over-reliance on visibility in the High Court; and, criteria that
would be commonly understood to cover men and not women.105
Gender stereotyping explained a number of these disadvantages; for
instance, the difficulty for some in obtaining briefs in cases traditionally
perceived to be male domains. One woman judge said: `there's definitely a
perception that the Criminal side is tough if you are down in the cells etc. It's
tougher for women to make their mark in that respect.'106 Another said: `not
every woman at the Bar is suited to being a Criminal lawyer because I think
there are particular types of attributes Criminal defence lawyers have . . .'.107
Another respondent stated that there remained a problem with gender
stereotypes at middle management in the Courts Service: `Sometimes how
people are treated in judicial office can be off-putting for future applicants'.
She added:
I'd be asked if I would pour coffee and that type of thing. Once I was trying to
improve accommodation within my court and I was visited by a member of
middle management who embarked on a discussion with me which just wasn't
acceptable and really was in the type of terms that he would have addressed his
wife if she had overspent the housekeeping money . . . there are a few
dinosaurs in there in their mid-fifties who really just find the concept of female
members of the judiciary very odd.108
While such instances of sexist language are less common today, the legacy
of such views remains potent in part due to the fact that the judges in the
higher courts are drawn from that generation of lawyers. The legal profes-
sion has also steadfastly resisted attempts to engage in anything approaching
the commitment to examining gender bias that characterized initiatives in the
United States and Canada in the 1980s and 1990s. It should be no surprise,
therefore, that women judges in Northern Ireland continued to experience
discrimination into the millennium. The undermining nature of these
comments further reinforces the exclusion of the woman as judge. This is
compounded by the lack of faith of many female holders of judicial office in
the mechanisms of accountability for addressing gender discrimination. In
general, they would not raise complaints for fear of victimization, and
consequent harm to their career. One woman who believed that she may
have experienced gender discrimination put it as follows:
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Well I wouldn't have felt confident about raising it. I don't think raising it
would have done any good. And the reason I say that is in the areas where I've
seen women raise these issues for example . . . [D]o you remember there was a
policewoman, a senior policewoman, who raised the issue that she had been
overlooked? But she was destroyed. She was completely trashed and destroyed.
And I just think that if you raise these things you are not going to be a popular
person, everybody knows that, and you'll be out outside like some lunatic.109
Another added:
[e]ven at my relatively senior level, women are inhibited from challenging ±
for fear of adverse reaction/labelling . . . Again, the problem is in the
profession rather than in the application system. The resultant disparity of
numbers of female Silks or judges is directly attributable to the endemic
discrimination in the profession.110
Yet another stated that `you will have a mark against you for any other
judicial posts that you might look at'.111 One other added: `in circumstances
where a male may be regarded as applying his rights, a female would be
regarded as a troublemaker.'112
Women judges had very low levels of confidence in the ability of the
professional bodies113 to address a complaint effectively ± which can lead
those similarly placed to doubt the safety and possible benefits of doing
likewise.114 Of the four women qualified as barristers who offered a rating of
such confidence on a scale of 1 to 10, the average rating was 3.5 (with values
of 2, 3, 4, 5). One woman judge added: `I don't think I would have ever
relied on them.'115 Another female judicial noted that there was no Women's
Bar Association in Northern Ireland, and observed: `given that they don't
feel free to congregate together and band together in that I can't imagine any
of them feeling free to put their head above the parapet.'116 Another stated,
`[t]hey have, in theory, got a Committee which deals with these matters but I
think my suspicion is that it might be window-dressing really and is tolerated
by the male members of the Bar really to keep the females quiet.'117 Of the
five women qualified as solicitors who offered a rating, the average rating
was 4.9 (with values of 3, 4, 4, 4.5, 9).118
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114 P. Thomas, `Introduction' in P. Thomas (ed.), Discriminating Lawyers (2000) xi±xviii.
115 Respondent D.
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118 An overall rating was lifted by one rating of 9 from a female judge who believed that
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The experience of discrimination by women judges, both formerly as
lawyers and as judges, is consistent with survey results from some other
jurisdictions. A survey in 2001 of members of the Association of Women
Solicitors in England and Wales reported that 32 per cent said they had
experienced sex discrimination at work.119 Martin found that 81 per cent of
women judges in the United States had experienced some form of sex
discrimination.120
The combined effect of the exclusion, discrimination, and undermining of
women's confidence in complaint tends to undermine her ability to be
treated as a judge. Baroness Hale suggests an alternative, one which disrupts
the assumed neutrality of the authoritative male judge:
We have to reflect ourselves in the way that we speak. I speak, as I said in a
recent opinion, as a `reasonable but comparatively weak and fearful
grandmother' with as much right to be heard as the stronger and braver
grandfathers around me.121
This is signally important, not only in terms of recognizing that judges have
a particular voice but by conveying honestly a self-deprecating assessment of
a personal voice ± one which marks out some difference from the normative
assumptions about judging. What difference, if any, would more women in
judicial office make? The Northern Ireland survey throws some light on this
issue.
CONSIDERING DIFFERENCE
Three of the 18 female respondents believed that having more women in
judicial office would make no difference. The majority of the female inter-
viewees indicated that women judges would, in various ways, make a
difference ± though not all to the process or outcome of judging. Their
responses can be categorized as relating to: (a) reflecting the gender ratio of
society generally, (b) enhancing public confidence, (c) changing the working
environment, (d) role-modelling for women, and (e) bringing different
approaches to judicial office than those brought by men. Some of these were
combined, as the following statement illustrates:
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I think it reflects, obviously, the balance in society. So . . . to the extent . . .
from the public's perception . . . I think it goes towards making it more
representative. I think women do bring different aspects and skills and
different life experiences to men, and that means that they will look at
situations in a different way ± which has merit. The more you get the
opportunity to have different views and experiences brought to the Bench can
only help in formulating good decisions.122
The most prevalent view, among four respondents, was that more women
would make judicial office more representative. One judge said: `I think that
in all walks of life there should be an equal balance between the
representation between men and women and I don't think the Court should
be any different.'123 As has been noted earlier, much of the official rationale
for more women in judicial office has been in such terms of equality or fair
representation. Ancilliary rationales are reflected in other responses from the
female respondents in this research. Two respondents believed that more
women would enhance public confidence in the judiciary. One stated, for
instance, `I think more people in society . . . would place more confidence in
us.'124 One respondent also believed that an increase in women would
enhance confidence among potential women applicants for judicial posts.125
Other respondents added that greater numbers of women would change
the working environment. One stated that it would make a difference to the
`atmosphere in the back corridor' at the Royal Courts of Justice where all the
(male) judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature have chambers.126 Another
woman judge referred to the effect of change on the `boys' network, boys'
club'.127 Such views are consistent with the views expressed by women
judges in a number of other jurisdictions. In the state of Victoria in Australia,
women were credited with contributing to working conditions in which there
was more informal contact and support for colleagues.128
There were, in addition, a variety of responses from five respondents
along the lines that women judges would bring different approaches to
judging. These responses ranged from that of the judge who thought that
women saw things from a different angle to those of judges who believed
that women judges helped draw out people. The latter view is illustrated by
one member of a tribunal who said:
It would bring in a different dimension I think. You don't apply the law any
differently. But I do think you see things from a different angle . . . I think we
could probably draw people out better in some ways. Certainly, it comes down
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to quite a lot of hard work trying to find out how people's feelings were
injured or hurt if they have been discriminated against. I think sometimes we
can get the better out of people than men can.129
This echoes a view about the late Dame Rose Heilbron, of whom it was said
when she was a King's Counsel that `[s]he defends a person more than a set
of facts. I think it shows that she is a woman.'130 A similar view was
attributed to the first woman judge in California, Georgia Bullock, who
observed that: `To a man judge [a female defendant] is likely to be just
another case. To a woman judge she is a problem that needs to be solved.'131
For Bullock, the subject before the court was a person facing a legal
problem. For the male judge, it was a defendant. Another female holder of
judicial office in the survey in Northern Ireland said:
I think it's very definitely simple the difference it would make, and I quote
Mary Robinson, the [former] President of Ireland, `women bring humanity to
our job', and I think it means that people, it doesn't matter who they are, men
or women, come before the bench and I think, generally, see a more human
face . . . most of them, generally, I think, feel that they have had . . . maybe . . . a
better hearing.132
Two other respondents believed that where women had experience of
bringing up children this would make a difference to judging (though the
conservative assumption that women are necessarily parents is striking). One
judge said:
I do think there's no doubt that women bring different qualities to different
things . . . you do have to take time off to have a child and bring a child up and
so on . . . do the doctors' appointments and the dental appointments . . . and
they obviously have a greater understanding of the needs and demands and so
on. I think you must have that representation.133
This echoes the views of Hale about the potential influence of parenting on
judging:
I would like to think that a wider experience of the world is helpful: knowing a
little about bearing and bringing up children must make some difference . . .
[although] there have been wonderful family judges who have never changed a
nappy or cooked a fish finger in their lives.134
One other judge in Northern Ireland who referred to parenting did so in
the context of multi-tasking and lateral thinking:
. . . women multi-task from birth. We have to. We can change a nappy and see
that the spuds aren't burnt dry, all at the same time . . . We can stop baking to
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pick up a broken china vase before a child falls on it. We can multi-task, and
. . . because we think laterally we don't just focus in linearly on what's
immediately in front of us.135
The same respondent referred to a shift from linearity to context as a
distinguishing feature of the female judge:
We don't take things out of context . . . because we can think laterally we don't
just focus in on the immediate issue, we can look and see `how does this fit
with . . . into context with'.136
She added: `even in sentencing in a Criminal Court we must have regard to
things like the person's background'. The possible impact on sentencing was
identified by another respondent, though, this time, based on what were seen
to be the different experiences of services that women have. She stated:
I think you would probably find that sentencing would go up dramatically,
there's all kinds of child abuse, sex crimes, there's absolutely no doubt about it
they have an entirely different attitude to it. I think they would be more
responsive to the needs of the client or customer. They would see it as
delivering a service because a lot of them have been on the receiving end of
the health service and other kinds of service systems and they would be more
likely to see what time we are doing this at, it does not fit in with what people
have to do.137
Finally, there were two additional themes identified by judges. One judge
added that `women are less likely to be taken-in by other women than men
are'.138 Another stated, `[i]t would bring a difference, I think. You don't
apply the law any differently, but I do think you see things from a different
angle.'139
The women judges also offered a range of attributes that go beyond those
currently expected of applicants. These additional attributes are: empathy,
respect for other people, patience, ability to recognize equality issues, and
being able to communicate well with members of the public and with
colleagues in the profession. One other judge added: `[c]ontinuing contact
with the community, being a part of the community and being aware of
what's going on in the community.'140 What may be said of these findings?
DISCUSSION
While a minority (five) of the women in the survey explicitly referred to the
fact that women make any difference to judging, it might be inferred that
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those women judges who identified different attributes from male judges
were also alluding to distinctive ways of judging. The minority view among
women judges surveyed here is certainly less pronounced than in the United
States, where Martin found that the majority of women judges believed that
women will approach judging differently to men.141 The low number of
women in Northern Ireland sharing this view could suggest that the majority
reject gender as relevant to the process or outcome of decision-making. This
might also reflect the conservative nature of the legal profession in Northern
Ireland, where there has been `little in the way of activist, let alone radical
lawyering.'142 This extends to the professional bodies, the Law Society of
Northern Ireland and the Bar Council of Northern Ireland.143 This has partly
been a consequence of traditional nature of legal education at universities in
Northern Ireland, from which the majority of the judiciary is drawn. Legal
education has not, until recently, included modules on gender and the law.
The tendency for many law schools to produce in their students an identity
that conforms to the norms of the profession is well-documented in the
United Kingdom144 and elsewhere,145 as is the conservatizing influence of
the legal profession generally on many who subsequently go into practice.146
Moreover in Northern Ireland, until the review in 2000 of criminal
justice,147 which included the courts, the judiciary had, compared to other
institutions of governance such as policing, largely escaped thoroughgoing
mechanisms of review and accountability. It would also appear that in the
absence of a long-standing representative body for women judges, non-
members are less likely to perceive that women will approach judging
differently from men. Few female holders of judicial office in Northern
Ireland are members of the International Association of Women Judges.
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There is no association of women barristers, and an association of women
solicitors is virtually moribund. In the absence of any collective professional
identity, it becomes more difficult to raise consciousness about collective
oppression. Martin found in the Unted States of America that women judges
who were not members of the National Association of Women Judges were
less likely than those women who were members to agree with the following
statements: that women have certain unique perspectives different from
those of men that ought to be represented on the bench; that women judges
are probably more sensitive to claimants raising issues of sexual dis-
crimination than are men, and; that women judges have an ability in the
decision-making process to bring people together in a way that men don't.148
The conservatism among respondents in Northern Ireland may also be
explained in part by the distinctive organizational structure of the legal
profession there, which facilitates homogeneity in outlook. Practising
barristers become members of the Bar Library, which occupies a single
building in Belfast, unlike the chambers system in England and Wales.149 In
the latter, barristers are dispersed in independent offices throughout the
country.150 English lawyers may occupy practices with distinct micro-
organizational cultures, specializing, for example, in progressive human
rights litigation or more traditional property work for high-net-worth clients.
Most barristers and solicitors in Northern Ireland have been educated in
Northern Ireland through to professional practice, absorbing a narrower
range of experiences than that of lawyers in England and Wales. Widening
of higher education in the 1990s means that proportionately fewer graduates
are middle-class, but, as Fox and Morison pointed out some fifteen years
ago, the racial and cultural background of lawyers is markedly
homogenous.151 The solicitors' profession comprises mainly small firms,
which have little exposure to the range of influences experienced by the
large, multi-national firms in England. A number of respondents in the
present study explained the conservatism, including gender conservatism,
with reference to the small size of the profession. `Everybody . . . knows
everybody else', said one.152
Holders of judicial office are drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of
barristers and solicitors in Northern Ireland, with some posts requiring at
least ten years standing as a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland or as a
solicitor of the Supreme Court, thus reflecting the characteristics of the
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profession. Historically, the senior judicial posts were occupied predomi-
nantly by Oxbridge-educated Protestants from unionist backgrounds.153 In
part, the low representation of Catholics reflected unionist/Protestant
domination within the new jurisdiction, but it was also a consequence of
the decision of most Catholics, who were predominantly nationalist, to
eschew careers in public office.154 Moreover, the recent period of violent
political conflict in Northern Ireland may have deterred some from applying.
Judges were listed as legitimate targets by Republican paramilitary organiza-
tions. A number of judges and lawyers were murdered for political reasons.
There is little evidence, therefore, that women judges in Northern Ireland
suggest radically different approaches in answer to the question of whether
more women on the bench will make any difference. This may also reflect a
fear that as historical outsiders, any difference will not be tolerated.
Subordinated groups are often occupationally socialized to think in this way,
with evidence of assimilation to the gender norms of the legal profession.155
Certainly in other jurisdictions where women were beginning to make an
appearance, few willingly marked out difference. As American judge Patricia
Wald noted in the early 1990s, when women were a small minority of judges:
For now, the judiciary is still a newly integrated male club, and women judges
are expected to be agreeable, charming, bright, incisive, non-threatening,
loyal, not irritatingly individualistic, supportive, cheerful, attractive, maybe
witty ± to a point, but not pushy, insistent, aggressive, sarcastic, unyielding or
any of the other qualities our male colleagues exhibit every day.156
Similarly, in Australia, Justice Mary Gaudron noted that:
To be different, to challenge the codes of conduct derived, as often as not,
from rules developed on the playing fields of Eton for male members of the
aristocracy, would have been to invite ostracism, perhaps, even, the attention
of the Ethics committee; to assert that women were different with different
needs would have been construed as an acknowledgment of incompetence; to
question the bias of the law would have been to invite judgment as to one's
fitness to become a member of the profession. And, thus, very many of us
became honorary men.157
Legal, political, and social factors will influence different consciousness
about gender and judging in different ways. Canada, for example, has a
longer, though still recent, experience of gender diversity. The first national
conference on the relationship between judicial neutrality and gender was in
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1986. The first gender bias task force in the United States was in 1982.158
The challenges faced by women in societies undergoing significant cultural
or political change, can have substantial impact on shaping awareness and
ability to speak out, as vividly illustrated in Shirin Ebadi's account of life as
a judge through the Iranian Revolution.159
While the majority of women judges in Northern Ireland eschew the idea
that women will reach a different decision, a significant proportion
nonetheless suggest that they may see the parties and issues differently. It
is noteworthy that the responses among the male judges were more limited in
range, though echoing some of the points made by women judges in relation
to changing the environment and difference of perspective. Two of the male
judges suggested differences. The Lord Chief Justice stated:
[t]hey comprise half of the population after all . . . they are bound to bring a
side to the job that's different . . . [W]omen have a different insight. There is no
question about that, and I would welcome from time to time the contribution
of women that they can convey to the Court of Appeal. I have just finished a
case in which I would have liked to have had the comments of a woman on the
case.
The other stated, more diffidently:
Only women will know what the impact is on a woman, and perhaps I will
never know. Although I have women in my life ± a wife, daughters, and of
course my mother ± there must be differences there. So, to the extent that it
opens our eyes and helps us appreciate the problems that some people might
have . . . we have good social intercourse within the bench, we meet regularly,
have dinner regularly, talk regularly . . . and if that rubs off on us then without
that input, I think we would be the poorer judges.160
Another judge added: `Once the High Court judges start being appointed on
a basis which is more representative of the community at large, I think that
will increase confidence.'161 However, a more senior judge's response was
telling. He acknowledged the difference the women might make at the Bar,
but did not extend this to the judiciary. He said: `[w]omen at the Bar have
made a difference. They've had a civilising influence. There's now less of
the roughness of a boys' club.'162
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CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the lack of a radical voice among women judges in
Northern Ireland, there appears to be evidence of some acknowledgement of
difference to men judges, namely: experiential sensitivities that may inform
judging, changes to the working environment, and being role-models for
other women. A number of women judges also identified attributes for
judicial office which were not identified by male respondents. In general,
women judges did not suggest they would decide differently, but their
responses also reflect nuances in understanding the role of judicial office that
are not shared by male judges. These are tentative conclusions given the
small sample, and due to the fact that there may have been some response
bias due to the remit of the research. Further research could help test this
tentative conclusion, for instance, by comparing women judges' responses
with their judgments, particularly if these could be compared with those of
men in the same or similar cases (though it needs to be remembered that no
women in Northern Ireland hold an appellate position).163 A number of the
experiential sensitivities revealed by the women judges in Northern Ireland
are not unlike those found by Abrams in her analysis of accounts by African-
American judges about how the latter perceived their roles. She argues that
they reflected `deep and nuanced familiarity with the (varied) circumstances
and life patterns of members of the African-American community.'164 She
continued to state that this familiarity `need not determine outcomes, but
often shapes the terms in which cases are conceived, or parties charac-
terized.'165 She concludes that:
[o]ne interesting aspect of these patterns of judicial perception is that they can
be understood not as moving judges in the direction of greater partiality
toward members of their group, but as eliminating the barriers . . . that have
prevented some judges from addressing these group members fairly when they
come before the court.166
The differences amongst the women judges interviewed in this research in
Northern Ireland, when combined with accounts from a sample of judges'
accounts elsewhere, appear not only to confirm but manifest Rackley's thesis
that `the pursuit of difference reveals the contingency of traditional accounts
of legal reasoning and the possibility of alternative and diverse adjudicative
voices which are not necessarily feminine or feminist in intonation.'167
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Women judges elsewhere have argued for attaining a judiciary that broadly
reflects a spectrum of experience and awareness: a `multiplicity of voices'168
or `multiple consciousness'.169 This approach is consistent with a number of
rationales for more women, and, indeed, other under-represented minorities
on the bench, which are: democratic legitimacy, trust, public confidence in
the judiciary, and diversity. Such an approach may disrupt the tendency for
judges to assume that society shares social, economic or moral values, at
least as these are reflected in the concept of the `public interest' or the
persistent fiction of the `reasonable man'. The argument for more women in
the judiciary based on diversity alone is relatively weak, even if it ultimately
leads to the judiciary `looking like' the rest of the population, unless that
diversity in gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and disability170 is also
reflected in a diversity of views that also reflects those backgrounds across
the judiciary as a whole.
The argument for greater diversity on the basis of gender, or indeed other
variables such as race, cannot be justified in terms of essential differences,
nor can the argument be based only on arguments about equality and
representation, though those arguments are strong to redress the historical
exclusion of women. The framing of arguments based on equality and
difference in dichotomous terms denies a much more complex field that
requires understanding of the social construction of the judge, judging, and
judicial authority, and the associated exclusion of outsider groups.171 A
thought experiment reveals the limitations of such an approach. If it were
possible to create a `virtual' judiciary that looked exactly like the groups that
one wished to see represented in judicial office, it could be said that the
judiciary was `diverse' and that the problem of under-representation was
solved. If, as is claimed by proponents of the representation-only rationale,
differences are not and should not be detectable in the approach to and
outcome of judging, one would wish to electronically programme the virtual
judiciary to apply the law automatically and consistently to every same-fact
situation. Yet, this manifestly negates the concrete particularities of human
existence. Moreover, no programme could conceive of the programming
permutations necessary for disposition of all cases over time, given law's
necessary lability and indeterminacy, and the disparate impact that judicial
background and experience has on adjudication. This should serve as a
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reminder that law is given meaning by, amongst other things, the different
perspectives and influences of its judges. The argument is not only about
gender, but also about experience and background. A more compelling
rationale for greater diversity in the judiciary lies in a synthesis of arguments
about representation and probable difference based upon background and
experiences. The denial that difference can exist in judicial authority,
however it may play out, negates the possibility of judicial understanding of
the standpoint position of the other, for the other cannot exist, in such terms,
as different from the judge.172 Rather than suggesting that women judges
will reach different decisions from those of men, this article suggests the
need to pay closer attention to any distinctive approaches that women judges
themselves report, in the context of reconsidering notions of judging and
judicial authority.
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